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Abstract
We model interhousehold transfers between nomadic livestock herders as the state-dependent consequence
of individuals’ strategic interdependence resulting from the existence of multiple, opposing externalities. A
public good security externality among individuals sharing a social (e.g., ethnic) identity in a potentially
hostile environment creates incentives to band together. Self-interested interhousehold wealth transfers
from wealthier herders to poorer ones may emerge endogenously within a limited wealth space as a means
to motivate accompanying migration by the recipient. The distributional reach and size of the transfer are
limited, however, by a resource appropriation externality related to the use of common property grazing
lands. When this effect dominates, it can induce transfers from households who want to relieve grazing
pressures caused by others’ herds. Our model augments the extant literature on transfers, and is perhaps
more consistent with the limited available empirical evidence on heterogeneous and changing transfers’
patterns among east African pastoralists. The core principles of our model possibly apply more broadly, for
example to long-distance migrants or even among “foot soldiers” in street gangs.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars’ explanations of interhousehold transfers serve as allegories for our understanding of human
nature and the social environment that conditions human behavior. This topic has consequently been a
source of dispute within most disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences. Philosophers have long
disagreed as to whether altruism is merely apparent, meaning that even states of mind that are directed
towards the welfare of others ultimately aim at advancing one’s own pleasure (Hobbes, 1650; Hobbes
1651; Butler 1726). Within anthropology, substantivists argue that transfers arise from a “moral economy”
in which prevailing ethical values such as generosity and individuals’ primordial right to subsistence assure
support for the poor (Scott, 1976), while rationalists counter that what appears to be a moral economy can
be wholly explained by self-interested, opportunistic individual behavior (Popkin, 1979).
Economists have engaged this debate as well. Some explain interhousehold transfers as the result
of altruistic preferences or some sort of moral code that constrains individual choice out of a sense of
fairness or noblesse oblige, perhaps complemented by the “warm glow” effects the giver enjoys from
impure giving (Phelps, 1975; Andreoni, 1989; Samuelson, 1993; Coate, 1995; Smith et al., 1995; Kirchler
et al., 1996; Barrett, 1999). Others explain transfers as an endogenously supportable insurance mechanism
adopted by purely self-interested individuals to cope with an environment of imperfect information and
missing financial markets in which individuals interact repeatedly (Kimball, 1988; Fafchamps, 1992; Coate
and Ravallion, 1993; Townsend, 1994; Platteau, 2000). We accept that these two canonical models explain
many interhousehold transfers. Surely some people provide insurance for one another and some can be
gracious toward those who suffer in their midst. However, the limited empirical evidence among the east
African pastoralists we have been studying intensely for the past decade seems inconsistent with either
explanation.
This paper therefore develops an alternative model appropriate to the particular setting we seek to
understand. But the core principles apply elsewhere as well, as we discuss in the concluding section. In our
model, transfers are a self-interested, manipulative gesture motivated by the strategic interdependence of
individuals sharing both access to a productive resource and a common social identity in a potentially
hostile environment. In our model, giving is intrinsically costly but can be instrumentally valuable to the
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giver if it motivates the recipient to undertake a self-interested action that has a positive spillover benefit
for the donor. Put differently, transfers can serve as costly but desirable coordinating mechanisms among
interdependent actors.
This is explicitly not a model of pure altruism nor of impure altruism due to “warm glow effects”
(Andreoni, 1989), because individuals value only their own welfare and not the act of giving. Nor is this a
model that relies on a patron-client relationship, in which marked inequalities in wealth, status or power
give rise to vertical insurance systems or exchange of nontraded services (e.g., protection) for tradable
goods and services such as material tribute or labor (Scott, 1976; Fafchamps, 1992; Carter, 1997; Platteau,
1995). In our model, redistribution occurs only with limited inequality in wealth and can be either
distributionally progressive or regressive. Finally, this is neither insurance nor investment in social capital,
because ours is a static model in which transfers do not occur in response to idiosyncratic shocks to agents’
wealth or income and there is no opportunity for reciprocal behavior.
In our model, a voluntary, self-interested wealth transfer is essentially a side payment for a
migration decision the recipient only prefers ex post, after having received the ‘gift’. While the transfer
may well strengthen the recipient’s inclination towards ‘cooperative’ behavior (Fehr et al., 1997; Akerlof,
1982) or elicit his penchant for reciprocity (Bowles et al.; 1997), the ‘service’ the recipient offers – through
the migration choice he makes – is unambiguously in his own interest. Like in the Bernheim et al. (1985)
model of strategic bequests, the wealth transfer is strategic in that it influences the recipient’s choice of
actions. Such transfers are manipulative in nature. But unlike the individually costly services – such as care,
visits, attention (Cox, 1987; Bernheim et al., 1985), sense of worth and status (Offer, 1997), and
remittances (Lucas and Stark, 1985)1 – considered in prior investigations of exchange-based motives for
private transfers, the service returned by the recipient to the giver in our model is not costly at all, as it
merely originates in the externality effects generated by the recipient’s self-interested, post-transfer choice.2
We motivate and situate our model in the context of east African pastoralists whose livelihoods
depend on the extensive grazing of livestock. One novelty of the current study is that we identify how
transfers can be risk reducing and/or productivity enhancing for the donor household. As noted by many
observers of pastoral economies, the area that a given user group calls its grazing area frequently has
ambiguous borders (Schlee, 1989; Oba, 1992; Goodhue and McCarthy, 2000; Haro et al., 2005). The
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flexible and contested nature of these boundaries creates an incentive for donor households to support
recipient households. Donor households have an interest in ensuring that their own group maintains access
to contested production areas and to repel attacks by other groups. Insufficient livestock not only threatens
a household with a food security crisis, but also threatens neighboring households with the potential loss of
an ally in a hostile environment due to the existence of wealth thresholds that determine a household’s
ability to migrate (Lybbert et al., 2004; Barrett et al., 2006; Santos and Barrett, 2006b). As a result,
progressive transfers may occur from richer to poorer households.
The production externality commonly assumed to exist in common property models is
consequently not the full story of strategic interdependence. This production externality must be balanced
against a security externality that arises from a “safety in numbers” effect. As many common property
resource areas are vast and only loosely controlled by a state exercising police authority, concerns about
security in such areas may be important.
Yet common property resource externalities matter. Indeed, as long as some basic level of public
goods are provided in particular locations, such appropriation externalities may even give rise to modest,
distributionally regressive transfers from poorer to wealthier households. We further argue that declines in
mobility and transfers in pastoral areas of east Africa can be at least partly explained by the exogenous
provision of public goods. As the state expands its reach into pastoral areas, it brings both security in the
form of police forces and some low-level safety net in the form of food aid and other transfers. These
services are typically confined to areas around towns, leading subpopulations to depend more on
exogenously supplied public goods and less on the endogenous private provision of public goods. A
gradual reduction in transfers and mobility in pastoral societies could then be at least partially due to
increased localized provision of public goods. Finally, our model offers insights into how the incomplete
provision of public services can lead to non-convex production functions commonly associated with
poverty traps.

I. BACKGROUND ON EAST AFRICAN PASTORALISTS
We develop our model around our observations of livestock transfers between nomadic
pastoralists in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of east Africa. Pastoralists’ livelihoods depend almost
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entirely on extensive livestock production. Traditionally, ASAL herders migrated with their herds in
search of pasture and water for their animals and survived mainly by consuming milk, meat, and livestock
blood. Few permanent settlements existed in pastoral areas in the pre-colonial and colonial eras. The few
settlements that existed were almost exclusively occupied by traders.

Pastoral households would

temporarily occupy areas near these trading points when conditions were favorable and move on as other
areas become more favorable.
The boundaries within which households moved were flexible and contested. The process of
groups pushing into new areas or being pushed out of old areas was a constant fact of life.3 Areas that were
accessible to members of a group at one point in time were not guaranteed to be accessible in the future.
Groups commonly raided others’ herds in order to augment their own wealth, particularly when there was
ample grazing land and water available elsewhere to sustain larger herds. Defense of a given area and of a
group’s livestock was the responsibility of group members, as was the potential conquest of neighboring
areas. Membership in a social group was thus critical for ensuring access to grazing lands and security of
one’s wealth.
Group membership also involved access to a set of livestock transfer arrangements that are
designed to circulate animals within ethnic groups (Schneider, 1979; Perlov, 1987; McCabe, 1987;
Ensminger, 1992; Little, 1992).4 One motivation for this study is that recent empirical work yields some
surprising conclusions with regard to transfer behavior that are difficult to reconcile with existing models of
transfers. One interpretation, given by Maybury-Lewis (1992), describes transfers as redistributive and
altruistic, albeit with shame replacing altruism. He quotes a pastoral elder stating that transfers occur since
“we must give to those who need it, for a poor man shames us all” (p.85), thus transfers should flow to the
less well off in society. However, Desta’s (1999) data show that among Borana pastoralists in southern
Ethiopia, the poorest quartile of herders was only one-sixth as likely to receive livestock gifts or loans as
the central half of the wealth distribution, and Santos and Barrett (2006a) and McPeak (2006) report
qualitatively similar results for east African pastoralists. Further, the sense of shame induced by having
members of the society become poor is difficult to reconcile with the observable fact that the very poor are
commonly abandoned, left to turn to begging, prostitution, and illicit drug and alcohol trade in grim
rangeland towns (Little et al., 2001).
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A different interpretation in the anthropological literature stresses risk sharing. Transfers among
pastoralists are socially embedded behaviors that occur in a risky production system, leading many
observers to interpret them as social insurance (Torry, 1973; Schlee, 1989; Oba, 1992). Unfortunately, the
informal insurance argument –that transfers are indemnity payments for idiosyncratic shocks herders suffer
- likewise seems inconsistent with the transfer patterns observed among contemporary pastoralists in east
Africa. Recent econometric studies find transfers are very small relative to losses suffered. Lybbert et al.
(2004) report that Boran pastoralists in southern Ethiopia receive, on average, a gift or loan of only one
head of cattle for every thirty livestock deaths beyond the community mean loss. McPeak (2006) finds
transfers tend to go to herders who have experienced positive rather than negative herd growth in the prior
year. These compensation proportions and timing of transfers suggest that interhousehold stock transfers
among pastoralists offer meager insurance against asset loss.5 This calls into question the completeness of
insurance motives as an explanation for transfers in this setting.
Furthermore, within pastoralist communities, one hears informal reports that transfers have
declined in frequency, scope and size over time. There also exists some indirect, albeit imperfect, evidence
consistent with such reports. For Gabra herders in northern Kenya, Torry (1973) reports cumulative
transfers per household since they began managing their herd independently averaging 17.8 camels out of
the herd (12.0 camels into the herd) and 8.0 cattle out of the herd (2.6 cattle into the herd). More than 20
years later in the same area, McPeak’s (2006) data for the same composition of inventory measures for
camels averages 1.3 (1.2) and for cattle 1.4 (2.0). Using Desta’s (1999) data, we derive similar suggestive
evidence from a simple univariate regression of average gross household livestock transfers (the sum of the
absolute value of transfers in and out) on a time trend variable yields a coefficient estimate of -0.147 cattle
per year, with a p-value of 0.012. Both bits of evidence suggest the need for a framework to understand
what factors could explain such declines in interhousehold transfers over time.
Those who rely on altruism or mutual insurance models of transfers must therefore explain the
apparent decline in interhousehold transfers as reflecting ‘moral decay’ or cultural decline. Of course, this
begs the question of why such decay happened. Our model does not rely on vague notions of moral decay
to explain declining transfers. Rather, we hypothesize that major changes in the bio-physical and socioeconomic environment of pastoralists in ASAL have induced the apparent sharp decline in transfers. We
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argue transfers traditionally kept people who lost their animals as mobile members of a group, thus
enabling recipients to continue to help provide for the common defense of herds and grazing areas. We
identify three key changes that could have undermined this logic behind transfer behaviour.
First, since the droughts of the early 1970’s, the provision of food aid to pastoral areas has become
increasingly frequent and the growth of towns has been rapid. Small towns that sprang up around relief
distribution sites in the ASAL have rapidly expanded. Food aid distribution is often not targeted at needy
recipients (Lentz and Barrett, 2005); identical food aid packages are given to all residents. So there is
basically a lump sum (food aid) payment made to those living near settlements, thus creating an incentive
to be in or around towns.6
Another important change is the growing violence in the rangelands. Livestock raiding between
ethnic groups has long been a feature of pastoral areas (Bollig, 1990; Markakis, 1993; Hendrickson et al.,
1996).7 However, over the past thirty years, the growth in ownership of small arms has made traditional
conflicts over pasture, water, and livestock increasingly lethal as civil strife in the region has created an
abundant supply of automatic weapons at low prices (Oba, 1992; Hussein et al., 1999; Osamba, 2000;
Smith et al., 2001). Government security forces rarely are able to stop these conflicts. Whether due to lack
of manpower, supplies, or interest, they more commonly concern themselves with security issues in and
around the small towns where they are posted.

Government provided security is largely a matter of

protecting town dwellers, while nomadic households are left to defend themselves as best as they can.
The third key change is that pastoralist mobility is has deteriorated over the past generation or so
due to loss of spatial refugia to expanding rangeland towns, to extension of rainfed crop cultivation into
traditional grazing areas, to recently gazetted parks and protected areas, and to violently contested noman’s-lands (Coppock, 1994; Desta, 1999; Fleisher, 1999; Heald, 1999). This has led to increased pressure
on resources in areas around town that are viewed as safe (McPeak, 2003), and also spurred conflict over
rangeland and watering points that were previously governed by overlapping, “fuzzy” property rights
(Goodhue and McCarthy, 1999).
In the following section, we develop a model that captures and explains many of the facts just
reported. We illustrate the interconnectedness of herd mobility, herd size, and transfers and show how the
localized provision of relief food and security can influence these relationships. This permits explanation
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of both the apparently striking change over time in transfer behavior among pastoralists and the current
observed transfer patterns that appear consistent with neither prevailing economic theories of altruistic
preferences nor of social insurance and reciprocity.

II. A MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL MIGRATION CHOICE
The analysis in this section focuses on a single agent’s binary decision over whether or not to migrate his
herd and aims at elucidating the differential and conditional impacts of migration determinants. This
analysis helps explain some stylized facts about pastoralism and apparent changes in the rangelands. It is
also foundational, for in section III we will generalize these behaviors to allow for the simultaneous,
strategically interdependent behaviors of multiple agents and allow the propositions with respect to
migration derived in this section to inform our understanding of the evolution of interhousehold transfers
among east African pastoralists.
The essence of our model is that there exist two externalities, an appropriation externality
associated with potential site-specific overgrazing – the classic “tragedy of the commons” effect – and a
physical security externality reflecting “strength in numbers” effects vis-à-vis hostile common opponents.
Which of these effects dominates depends on herd sizes across agents in different ethnic groups, the level
of external transfers available, and prevailing ecological conditions on the range. As section III shows,
when the public security externality dominates, some agents may make limited strategic asset transfers to
somewhat poorer kinfolk in order to induce co-migration to an unsafe location. When the appropriation
externality dominates, some households transfer wealth to kin in order to induce them to migrate away and
thereby relieve pressure on the common property grazing area. These transfers might even be regressive,
flowing from poorer to richer households, although this phenomenon appears rare in practice. Overall, this
model predicts precisely the sorts of current transfer patterns reported in the previous section, and can
explain the shift over time that seems to have taken place in pastoralists’ interhousehold transfer behavior.
This framework is likewise consistent with the common sociological observation that individuals sharing a
common identity frequently appear as allies in one setting (e.g., when faced with a common adversary in
distant locations) and as competitors in other domains (e.g., over scarce forage and water for their herds
near their homelands).
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We structure the model in such a way as to underscore that neither insurance nor altruism could
motivate the transfers that endogenously result.8 We use this structure not because we do not believe that
altruism or insurance are factors in the complex reality of east African pastoralism, but rather to isolate this
new mechanism we model, which seems to offer a conceptual reconciliation with the empirical evidence on
east African pastoralists that extant models of transfers fail to provide.
a. The agents and locations
Consider a two-area setting (respectively, a base camp near an established settlement, B, and a more distant
satellite area, S). Define the livestock carrying capacity of each area

a ∈ {B, S} , denoted Lamax(RFa), as

the maximal number of animals that can be placed on that plot without causing a decline in per animal
productivity. We assume that areas are large enough that no single herder could feasibly manage a herd size
equal to or greater than the carrying capacity in a given area. Carrying capacity is thus only a potential
constraint when there are multiple herds in a given area. Carrying capacity is increasing in the rainfall
realizations on an area, RFa. Because herders in this region make migration decisions typically only after
observing realized rainfall, thanks to word of mouth and/or reports from scouts sent out to prospect
alternative grazing areas (O’Leary, 1985; Oba, 1992; Luseno et al., 2003), we assume that rainfall, while
variable, is known; the model results are robust to making rainfall stochastic. Area-specific per animal
productivity,9 fa(RFa)≥0, is assumed to be increasing and concave in realized rainfall. Satellite areas have
higher intrinsic productivity than base areas, fS(RF)>fB(RF) for identical rainfall. For the same ecological
reasons that productivity is higher there, satellite area carrying capacity exceeds base area carrying capacity
for identical rainfall realizations, LSmax(RF) > LBmax(RF).
Let there be three different herders representing two different, mutually hostile ethnic groups.
Herders 1 and 2 share a common ethnic identity and are thus allies in any inter-ethnic conflict; herder 3
hails from the rival group. The herd size distribution {L1, L2, L3} is common knowledge. Each herder
makes a discrete decision whether or not to migrate from his base camp area to the satellite area (m=1 for
migration, 0 otherwise).10 Henceforth, we set m3 exogenously equal to 1. Thus, at the satellite area, there
always exists a positive risk of inter-ethnic conflict. For the remainder of this section, we study herder 1’s
migration choice, m1, conditional on the migration choice of herder 2, m2, and a given herd size of a rival
group at the satellite area so as to be able to focus on the determinants of pastoralist migration. In the next
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section we relax this exogeneity assumption and explore the strategically interdependent migration
decisions of the two herders and the distribution-conditional transfer regime that results endogenously.
b. Appropriation and security externalities
When the number of animals occupying an area exceeds its variable carrying capacity, productivitydegrading overgrazing results. Hence, in the event of excessive resource competition, an appropriation
externality arises, wherein one herder’s migration choice affects the productivity of other herders’ animals.
The herders (sharing a common identity) in the base area thus become competitors. Let δa= (L1a+ L2a +
L3a)/Lamax(RFa) express the area-specific occupancy rate as a proportion of its rainfall-dependent carrying
capacity.11 Then, we can define the expected proportional per animal productivity loss due to the
appropriation externality as ηa(L1a, L2a, L3a, RFa) = (δa-1)/δa if δa ≥ 1 and ηa = 0 if δa < 1. This implies that
herder 1’s expected productivity loss at the satellite area is weakly increasing in herder 2’s migration
decision, ∂ηS /∂m2 ≥ 0. Conversely, herder 1’s expected productivity loss at the base area is weakly
decreasing in his kinsman’s migration decision, ∂ηB /∂m2 ≤ 0.
Production is increasing in area-specific growth potential and actual rainfall. The common
property appropriation externality negatively affects the production function only when the area-specific
carrying capacity is exceeded. In the absence of the common property externality,12 the pastoralist’s
production is unambiguously increasing in individual herd size.
Other herders’ migration decisions matter not only because of prospective resource competition
but also due to possible security externalities. If herders 1 and 2 both migrate to the satellite area, then
because of inter-ethnic violence and/or livestock raiding they both risk a loss of animals.13 Denote this
security risk, again expressed as an expected proportional per animal productivity loss, as θ Є [0,1]. At the
satellite area, this security risk θ is a decreasing function of the aggregate herd size L1+L2. Intuitively, since
security critically depends on human labor rather than herd size and given that treks are typically made in
roughly fixed herder/herd size proportions, the larger the aggregate herd size, the more herders around to
fend off the common enemy. There is strength in numbers in the sense that the presence of another member
of a herder’s ethnic group reduces his expected losses due to raiding and violence through a security
externality. Hence, a common identity in the satellite area makes pastoralists allies.14 Without loss of
generality, we assume that security risk θ = 0 at the base camp since the pastoralists who belong to a
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different social group never try to occupy the common property lands of another group and pastoralists of a
same social group never raid or act violently against each other. At the satellite area, the limiting case of θ
= 0 only arises in the absence of violent raiding or if the rival group does not likewise occupy the area with
its herd (m3 = 0).
An important trade-off now emerges. If herders 1 and 2 both migrate, then the presence of more
pastoralists from 1’s ethnic group may create a positive security externality against raiding. On the other
hand, it may also generate a negative resource appropriation externality, if and only if the resulting
occupancy rate exceeds the area’s carrying capacity.
c. Exogenous transfers and movement costs
As mentioned in section I, food aid has become nearly ubiquitous in the rangeland towns of the East
African ASAL. We therefore introduce an exogenous transfer from outside the system, τ, which pastoralists
only receive if they are at base camp, where they have ready access to town-based distribution of relief
food.15 This geography of food aid distribution creates a cost to migration that, because, as mentioned
earlier, treks are typically made in fixed herder/herd size proportions, is monotonically increasing in herd
size.16 So if herder 1 chooses to leave the base camp for higher expected productivity satellite areas, he
faces an opportunity cost of τ(L1), with τ’ > 0,. In addition to this cost of foregone food aid, the migrating
pastoralist incurs variable movement costs, mc(L1), that are similarly monotonically increasing in herd size,
with mc(0) = 0 and mc’ > 0. This cost reflects the animal weight loss and risk of injury or loss to wild
predators incurred on the migratory trek.
d. The pastoralist’s migration choice
We assume pastoralists maximize expected income conditional on others’ simultaneous choice (m2) that
affects their payoffs. Utility is assumed to be increasing in income and, at the time of deciding whether to
migrate, the key environmental parameters that shape the appropriation and security externalities are
known to all.17 The choice problem faced by pastoralist 1 is thus:
(1)

E (Y
Max
{ }
m1 ∈ 0 ,1

{

1

| m2

(

)
(

))

( )} (

){

( )}

Y 1 ≡ m1 (1 − η S ) 1 − θ L1 + m 2 L2 L1 f S (RFS ) − mc L1 + 1 − m1 (1 − η B )L1 f B (RFB ) + τ L1
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The first term of our expression for Y1 represents pastoralist 1’s payoff if he migrates to the satellite area,
whereas the second term captures his payoff when staying at the base area. Both terms include an
expression for the pastoralist’s effective herd productivity, defined as his ex ante herd size adjusted for the
expected impacts of the appropriation and security externalities, multiplied by the site-specific per animal
productivity.
Pastoralist 1 then rationally decides to move to the satellite camp (m1 = 1) if and only if

f S (RFS ) − f B (RFB ) ≥ Ω

(2)

{

(

where Ω ≡ f S (RFS ) η S + θ L + m L
1

2

2

)(1 − η )}− f (RF ){η } + τ (LL ) + mcL(L ) . The lefthand
1

S

B

B

B

1

1

1

side of (2) reflects a measure of general migration appeal, common for all pastoralists facing the same
migration choice. The value of Ω is individual-specific since it depends in part on agent 1’s individual herd
size, L1. All else equal, this migration condition is more likely to be satisfied when τ(L1) and mc(L1) are
small. This underscores how point-based free food aid distribution discourages migration, leading to
increased herd concentration in base camp areas, an observation borne out empirically in the region
(McPeak 2003). So in the absence of site-specific food aid transfers and variable movement costs, all
pastoralists would move. But those costs of moving induce pastoralists with smaller herds to choose to stay
at base camp and suffer lower productivity. More generally, however, the returns to migration depend
fundamentally on m2, L1, L2, L3 θ, LBmax(RFB) LSmax(RFS), fB(RFB), fS(RFS), mc(.), and τ(.).
Let us define the individual-specific migration threshold, L1*( m2, L2, L3 θ, LBmax(RFB) LSmax(RFS),
fB(RFB), fS(RFS), mc(.), τ(.)) as the minimum herd size that makes migration to the satellite area preferable.
In other words, L1* is the value for pastoralist 1’s herd size that makes his migration condition hold with
equality: fS(RFS) -fB (RFB) = Ω (L1* ). In what follows, we let Ω(L1*) = fS(RFS) -fB (RFB) ≡ Ω*. For any
given combination of parameter values, production functions and migration strategies chosen by the other
herders, this specification generates a monotone, piecewise concave income function that is globally
convex in herd size, with a kink point at L1*.18 The resulting threshold effect implies that ceteris paribus
pastoralists with a herd size below L1* find themselves in a low-level equilibrium of the sort described for
this region empirically by Lybbert et al. (2004), McPeak and Barrett (2001) and Barrett et al. (2006).
Now, wealthier pastoralists are more likely to migrate to the satellite area if and only if
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∂Ω
≤0
∂L1
(3)
⇔

( )

( )

∂η
τ L1 + mc L1 − L1 (mc'+τ ')
∂θ
⎧ ∂η
⎫
f S (RFS )⎨ 1s (1 − θ ) + 1 (1 − η s )⎬ − f B (RFB ) 1B ≤
2
∂L
∂L
⎩ ∂L
⎭
L1
The righthand side of inequality (3) is necessarily positive, equaling zero if marginal migration costs are
constant. The two terms on the lefthand side of inequality (3) correspond with the change in expected
productivity caused by an incremental change in individual herd size respectively at satellite and base area.
In the absence of overstocking (i.e., ∂η / ∂L = 0 ), the lefthand side of (3) is negative and hence the
1

condition clearly holds. If the appropriation externality occurs in the base camp but not in the satellite area,
as is often the case (McPeak 2003) then inequality (3) still unambiguously holds. In the more general
setting where appropriation externalities exist in both places, no fully general result exists. An increase in
herd size is more likely to trigger migration to the satellite area the larger (smaller) the induced change in
the negative appropriation externality at the base (satellite) area, and the greater the corresponding change
in the positive security externality at the satellite area. A key assumption is
ASSUMPTION 1: Differences in rangeland carrying capacity across satellite and base area are such
that

∂η
∂η B
>> 1S
1
∂L
∂L

∂θ
⎡
(
)
(1 − η S )⎤⎥ .
−
+
1
θ
1
⎢⎣
∂L
⎦

Given the apparent empirical regularity among east African pastoralists that herd size is positively related
to the probability of migration,19 we henceforth assume that the difference in rangeland carrying capacity
between satellite and base areas is indeed great enough that wealthier pastoralists are ceteris paribus more
likely to migrate than poorer pastoralists. This leads to the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. A marginal increase in individual herd size
decreases the migration threshold.
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Let us next evaluate how an increase in wealth of a (non)migrating ally influences one’s incentive
to migrate. Two cases are separately considered: m2 = 1 and m2 = 0. Making use of the Implicit Function
Theorem, we can rewrite the marginal effect of the herd size owned by one’s clansman on the individual’s
migration threshold as:

∂Ω*

∂L
∂L2
=
−
∂Ω* 1*
∂L2
∂L
1*

(4)

In the case where m2 = 1, the numerator of (4) takes the form
(5)

∂Ω *
∂θ
⎫
⎧ ∂η
= f S (RFS )⎨ 2S (1 − θ (L1 + L2 )) + 2 (1 − η S )⎬
2
∂L
∂L
⎭
⎩ ∂L

while the denominator is

−

(6)

∂Ω *
∂L1*

Given Assumption 1, the denominator is strictly positive. If in response to a marginal increase in 2’s herd
size at the satellite area, pastoralist 1 is more likely to migrate to the satellite area, then the migration
decisions of both pastoralists are defined as strategic complements. Mathematically, strategic
complementarity requires that

∂θ
⎫
⎧ ∂η s
1
2
⎨ 2 1 − θ L + L + 2 (1 − η s )⎬ < 0
∂L
⎭
⎩ ∂L
⇔

(

(7)

(

))

∂θ
(1 − η s ) > ∂η2s 1 − θ L1 + L2
2
∂L
∂L

(

(

))

In words, the positive security externality effect generated by an increase in pastoralist 2’s wealth (|∂θ/∂L2|)
must outweigh the inextricable nonpositive appropriation externality effect. If the rangeland conditions in
the satellite area are such that the new occupancy rate is still less than its carrying capacity, then the
requirement for strategic complementarity unambiguously holds and a marginal rise in wealth of pastoralist
2 generates only a positive public goods security externality, enhancing pastoralist 1’s expected benefits
from migrating. Conversely, in the absence of the risk of livestock raiding (θ = 0, and |∂θ/∂L2| = 0), the
requirement for strategic complementarity will never be satisfied. The corollary conditions for when the
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migration choices of pastoralist 1 and 2 constitute strategic substitutes can be readily derived in an
analogous fashion.
In the case where m2 = 0, the numerator of (4) equals
(8)

∂η
∂Ω *
= − f B (RFB ) 2B .
2
∂L
∂L

Thus, a marginal increase in the herd size of the non-migrating pastoralist either leaves the migration
decision of his fellow kin unaffected or lowers the latter’s migration threshold. In sum, we establish that:
PROPOSITION 2: A marginal increase in the herd size of a migrating pastoralist 2 lowers
pastoralist 1’s migration threshold if and only if the induced positive security externality effect
outweighs the parallel negative appropriation externality effect. A marginal increase in the herd
size of a non-migrating pastoralist 2 never raises pastoralist 1’s migration threshold.
Change in external food aid transfers likewise affects pastoralist 1’s migration behavior. By
similar use of the Implicit Function Theorem, one can readily establish that a rise in food aid transfers
unambiguously increases pastoralist 1’s migration threshold by increasing the cost of migration.20 As a
consequence, the required minimal herd size to make migration attractive increases in the level of freely
available food transfers.
PROPOSITION 3: An increase in the total amount of freely available transfers raises pastoralist 1’s
migration threshold.
A marginal rise in pastoralist 3’s herd size (weakly) increases pastoralist 1’s migration threshold because it
increases the risk of livestock loss (see footnote 12) and may affect productivity in the satellite area due to
an appropriation externality.
PROPOSITION 4: Pastoralist 1’s migration threshold is weakly increasing in the hostile
pastoralist‘s herd size at the satellite area.
Rainfall obviously influences pastoralist 1’s equilibrium migration strategy. Increased rainfall in
the satellite area lowers pastoralist 1’s migration threshold because productivity away improves. A
marginal increase in rainfall also increases the carrying capacity of the satellite area, possibly reducing ηS
and thereby creating further productivity gains. Conversely, if rainfall increases in the base area, pastoralist
1’s migration threshold increases because it stimulates base area livestock productivity both directly and
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indirectly by potentially mitigating local appropriation externalities by increasing the base area’s carrying
capacity.21 In sum, microvariability in precipitation induces pastoralists to follow the rains, migrating if it
falls in the satellite area, staying if it falls around the base camp.
If the marginal change in rainfall is uniformly distributed across both the satellite and base areas,
as often happens in time of drought, then, since fS(RF) >fB (RF), any incremental change in rainfall (∆)
increases fS(RFS+∆) - fB(RFB+∆) at a decreasing rate. Rainfall also affects Ω.. In sum, a uniform marginal
increase in rainfall at both satellite and base areas generates a downward shift in the pastoralist 1’s
migration threshold.
PROPOSITION 5: A marginal change in rainfall favoring the satellite (base) area induces a
downward (upward) shift in pastoralist 1’s migration threshold. Pastoralist 1’s migration
threshold falls in response to a spatially uniform change in rainfall.
The final relation we seek to establish in this section relates to change in the security risk
parameter, θ. An increase in the exogenous risk of raiding, perhaps due to the spread of modern weaponry,
or to increased interethnic tensions due to political disputes, diminishes pastoralist 1’s expected payoff
from migrating and thus dampens his propensity to migrate.
PROPOSITION 6: An increase in the exogenous risk of raiding generates an upward shift in
pastoralist 1’s migration threshold.
The insights summarized in these six propositions lay the foundation for the next section, which
explores transfer choices as the rational outcome of pastoralists’ strategic interdependence through both
appropriation and security externalities. The tradeoffs between risk of violence and livestock raiding and
stocking rate pressures on common property rangelands create a limited space in which livestock transfers
occur. The pattern of these transfers reflects particular combinations of ecological conditions, ex ante herd
distributions, external transfer volumes, and the exogenous probability of violence. This matches the
empirical evidence on east African pastoralists that extant theories cannot readily explain.

III. TWO-PERSON NON-COOPERATIVE MIGRATION GAME
The preceding section treated the decision of pastoralist 1 in isolation from the simultaneous,
interdependent choice of the other pastoralist so as to better understand the nature and determinants of the
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crucial migration choice.

In this section, we treat the two pastoralists’ decisions as a sequential,

noncooperative game of transfer followed by migration choices in order to tease out the conditions under
which transfers emerge in equilibrium in the absence of altruism or repeated interactions that might permit
endogenously enforceable informal insurance contracts.
The intuition of the results we develop runs as follows. The larger an individual’s herd, the greater
the incentive to migrate to the satellite area, ceteris paribus. When stocking rate pressures on the open
range are low or nonexistent and there is real risk of livestock raids, a relatively wealthy, migrating
pastoralist may then benefit from manipulating a poorer ally’s independent migration choice by transferring
animals to him and thereby inducing him to move voluntarily, and thus to fight alongside the bigger herder
against their common foe.22 However, some pastoralists are so poor that the transfer necessary to induce
them to migrate is excessive relative to the security externality benefits the wealthier herder would enjoy.23
As a consequence, the resulting egalitarian transfers are limited in two crucial senses. First, they
are limited to the transfer level necessary just to bring one’s ally to his migration threshold and thereby
induce him to move – and fight – alongside the donor.24 Thus transfer volumes are small.25 Second, they
are limited only to ally households that are below but reasonably near the migration threshold, so that the
security externality benefits can justify the cost of the animals given away. One outcome is that the poorest
members of the ethnic group do not receive internal transfers (just external transfers of food aid), have herd
sizes too small to migrate, and are consequently trapped in a relatively low productivity equilibrium.
This gives rise to a second, distinct type of manipulative transfer. If overstocking pressures are
significant around the base areas, some pastoralists may find it in their interest to transfer an animal to
another herder whose ex ante herd size lies just below his migration threshold, so as to induce the recipient
to move and thereby increasing the productivity of the remainder of the donor’s herd. If the probability of
migration is increasing in herd size, such transfers to induce others to vacate shared rangelands around a
base camp will typically be regressive, from poorer herders to slightly wealthier ones, although in principle
such transfers could be to anyone.

Still, this gives us a candidate explanation for the (infrequent)

observation of modest regressive livestock transfers among east African pastoralists.26 There thus exist
state-dependent interdependencies between migration choices undertaken by pastoralists sharing a common
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social identity, manipulative interhousehold transfer behaviors, and low-level productivity equilibria for
pastoralists trapped in and around rangeland towns.
Without loss of generality, let 1 be the wealthier of the two herders in the same ethnic group (L1 ≥
L2).

Given the discrete, simultaneous migration decision by these two agents, in theory there exist four

different combinations of migration strategies that can possibly emerge. However, Proposition 1 rules out
one of these possibilities because if 1 does not choose to migrate, then neither will 2 move because
migration incentives are increasing in herd size. Figure 1 depicts the feasible strategy space of three
migration/no migration combinations.
The problem, from pastoralist 1’s perspective, is now one of maximizing expected income subject
to the independent choice of pastoralist 2. Each of the two herders is simultaneously solving the migration
choice problem in (1). The key now is to recognize that their common social identity can create an
incentive for either 1 or 2 to offer his fellow group member a side payment in the form of an interhousehold
livestock transfer, in order to induce the other to migrate. To be more precise, 1’s migration choice now
becomes

( )

Max E Y 1

β12 , m1∈{0 ,1}

(9)

{
(
+ (1 − m ){(1 − η )L f (RF ) + τ (L

)

(

Y 1 ≡ m1 (1 − η S ) 1 − θ ( L1 − β 12 + m 2 ( L2 + β 12 )) ( L1 − β 12 ) f S (RFS ) − mc L1 − β 12
1

1

B

1

B

B

− β 12

)}

)}

where β12 is the transfer from 1 to 2, chosen by 1 only if m1=1.27 Intuitively, β12>0 only when the transfer is
necessary and sufficient to induce 2 to migrate (that is, when herder 2’s incentive compatibility constraint is
satisfied), and when the security benefits to 1 of 2’s migration outweigh the costs of both relinquishing
wealth and potentially aggravating the resource appropriation externality in the satellite area (that is, when
herder 1’s rationality constraint is satisfied). The minimum transfer necessary to induce 2 to move will be
β12min=max(L*2|m1=1 –L2, 0).28 Clearly, if herder 2 already owns sufficient livestock so that he benefits from
migrating to the satellite area irrespective of whether he is given additional animals, there is no need for 1
to make a transfer: β12min=0. If, however, L2 is sufficiently small that without the transfer 1 believes that
m2*=0, then a stock transfer may be in 1’s interests. Define β12max as the transfer level that would leave
herder 1 indifferent between making a transfer and moving to the satellite area alone. Obviously β12max> 0
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if and only if strategic complementarity exists, i.e., if 2’s presence in the satellite area confers more security
benefits than it costs in resource competition.
Put these two conditions together and equilibrium positive transfers must fall in the interval [β12min,
β12max]. No transfers result if β12max< β12min or β12min=0. This is the sense in which transfers are limited in
volume and can exclude both the poorest and richest pastoralists under contemporary conditions. If the
migration threshold is reasonably high, perhaps because food aid distribution is significant, carrying
capacity is low and security risks are great, then the necessary transfer to induce 2’s migration may well
exceed 1’s reservation transfer level. We conjecture that over time, the changes in the east African ASAL
have caused [β12min, β12max] to shrink, thereby explaining why significant past interhousehold transfers have
fallen markedly.
Although transfers will only occur among pastoralists of the same social identity, they need not
always be distributionally progressive. If either herder is willing to migrate based on his ex ante herd size,
then β12>0 is a possible transfer in equilibrium. This result obtains because 1 will always be willing to
migrate when 2 is willing to migrate, since the only difference in their choice problem is their ex ante herd
size and, by proposition 1, the migration threshold is decreasing in herd size. However, if neither 1 nor 2
have ex ante herd sizes sufficient to justify migration, the possibility of regressive equilibrium transfers
arises. The logic depends on the notion of strategic substitutes, as defined in the previous section. If herd
sizes in the base camp area are sufficient to induce significant appropriation externalities and pastoralist 1’s
herd size falls just below his migration threshold, then a livestock transfer from the poorer household, 2, to
the richer-but-still-poor household, 1, may be mutually beneficial.29 Somewhat more formally, the
minimum transfer necessary to induce 1 to move would be β21min= max(L*1|m2=0 –L1, 0). Now define β21max
as the transfer level that would leave herder 2 indifferent between making a transfer intended to induce 1 to
exit the base camp common property and sharing those grazing areas in spite of the overstocking pressures.
Strategic substitutability is necessary but not sufficient for β21max > 0, just as strategic complementarity is
necessary but not sufficient for β12max > 0. If the transfer necessary to induce 1’s migration is no greater
than the maximum transfer 2 is willing to make to have the base camp grazing area to himself, then a
regressive transfer in the interval [β21min, β21max] can take place in equilibrium.
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Furthermore, if both 1 and 2 have ex ante herd sizes sufficient to justify migration provided they
migrate together, then the possibility of regressive equilibrium transfers arises. The transfer then serves as a
way of eliminating the possibility of a coordination failure: pastoralist 2 offers 1 just enough cattle to
ensure that the latter migrates irrespective of 2’s decision. Formally, the minimum transfer to induce 1 to
move regardless of 2’s actions would be β21min’= max(L*1|m2=0 –L*1|m2=1, 0). Now define β21max’ as the
transfer level that would leave herder 2 indifferent between making a transfer intended to induce 1 to exit
the base camp common property whether she migrates or not, and staying on the base camp. If then the
interval [β21min’, β21max’] is nonempty, then a regressive transfer will take place in equilibrium.
Let us now summarize the feasible options in strategy space. First, we briefly consider one other
situation, namely when θ = 0, wherein the only manipulative transfers that could exist in equilibrium would
be regressive transfers meant to relieve the resource appropriation externality in the base area. These will
necessarily only be offered if 2’s gift induces 1 to migrate while 2 remains at the base camp (m1 = 1, m2 =
0). In this setting, transfers represent a Coasian mechanism to resolve the resource appropriation
externality. Such regressive transfers could, in theory, occur regardless of the size of the security risk in the
satellite area. However, because L*1|θ>0 ≥ L*1| θ=0 following Proposition 4, β21min| θ>0 ≥ β21min| θ=0. In words,
the transfer necessary to induce 1 to vacate the base area is necessarily larger when 1 expects to then incur
a greater livestock loss at the satellite area. This necessarily implies that regressive transfers to a pastoralist
who then has to fight for his grazing land are both less likely and, when they occur, larger than regressive
transfers to those who do not ultimately have to fight.
The more likely possibility for limited progressive manipulative transfers arises when L1 ≥ L*1.
Strategic transfers within a social group may be mutually advantageous to 1 and 2. Progressive
interhousehold transfers intended by 1 to induce 2 to migrate and fight alongside him necessarily occur
only if both parties ultimately move to the satellite area, fostering ethnic conflict over scarce resources (m1
= m2 =1), as shown in Figure 2. Note, however, that in principle one could see regressive transfers because
the security externality creates a coordination game best resolved by a small transfer from the poorer herder
to the wealthier one so as to ensure that 1 migrates regardless of 2’s choice.
Figure 3 depicts the relevant β12min and β12max curves for a given set of parameters {L1, L2, L3, RFa,
fa(.), θ, τ}. The shaded area reflects the set of feasible progressive transfers in equilibrium, which depends
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on how 1 and 2 interact. For ease of exposition, we hereafter assume 1 chooses β12 unilaterally, subject to
satisfying 2’s incentive compatibility constraint to migrate, implying that β12= β12min.30 As defined earlier,
β12min is a linear, decreasing function of L2 with unit slope in absolute value that is positive only below
L*2.31 The willingness-to-transfer function, β12max, can never be positive below L*1, and is concave in L1
thereafter, increasing so long as the marginal change in the appropriation externality is dominated by the
marginal change in the security externality, thus increasing expected per animal productivity for 1:
(10)

∂η s
∂mc( L1 ) ∂θ
(
)
θ
< 2 (1 − η s )
−
+
1
∂L
∂L2
∂L1

The result is that not only are transfers limited to within the social group, but the fact that β12max is
decreasing in L1 beyond some threshold point and that β12min is decreasing in L2 limits the wealth space
within which progressive interhousehold transfers occur.

The poorest pastoralists (those in the

neighborhood of L2=0 in Figure 2) receive no wealth transfers and the biggest herders make no transfers.
This is a limited rational egalitarianism in which distributionally progressive transfers flow from an “upper
middle class” to a “lower middle class” as a result of agents’ identity-dependent strategic interdependence.
This model thus yields predictions that contrast with both the insurance model, where net transfers covary
positively with asset shocks but are unrelated to wealth, and with the canonical altruism model, where net
transfers are monotonically increasing in wealth. We leave for future work empirical investigation to try to
identify what proportion of observed transfers is best explained by each model.
The set [β12min, β12max] may be empty. Figure 3 depicts how a decrease in Lsmax, the satellite area
carrying capacity, might extinguish transfers in equilibrium. Because security risks increase in the satellite
area, L*1 and L*2 both increase, per proposition 3, and the resource appropriation externality effect becomes
more pronounced, diminishing the prospective benefits to 1 of a migration by 2. Relative to the base case
depicted in Figure 3, this increases β12min and decreases β12max for any {L1, L2}, potentially extinguishing
herder 1’s incentive to manipulate 2’s migration choice through a stock transfer.
A situation where no equilibrium transfers occur is more likely to arise as the exogenous risk of
raiding parameter increases, the carrying capacity at the satellite area decreases (leaving no scope for cases
where the induced positive security externality surpasses the negative competition externality), the basesatellite productivity differences are low and the level of food transfers is high. Such parameter value shifts
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reflect the stylized changes over the past generation in conditions on the east African rangelands described
in section I and may help explain the apparent reduction in interhousehold transfers observed among
pastoralists there.

IV. CONCLUSION
Although models of interhousehold transfers have long fascinated social scientists, the extant models based
on altruism or mutual insurance appear insufficient to explain some patterns of transfers and change in
those behaviors. We illustrate this with reference to east African pastoralists and use that case to motivate
an alternative, complementary model of transfers.

Our model predicts that transfers are limited in

frequency, scope, size and distributional reach, and occasionally flow from poorer to richer households.
The model explains the observed decline in transfers as a byproduct of changing environmental conditions
–increased town-based provision of food aid, diffusion of weapons leading to more inter-group violence,
and reduced rangeland carrying capacity – that exogenously affect transfer incentives. Although the
hypotheses our model generates are the only ones consistent with the mass of ethnographic, range science
and economic evidence on which we draw, they are unfortunately not directly testable with available data.
Nor would we expect new data to shed much light on this phenomenon since we are trying to explain an
important phenomenon that seems to have largely vanished.
The theoretical model nonetheless provides an alternative, integrated understanding of
pastoralists’ migration and interhousehold transfer behavior, with significant policy implications. Notably,
interventions that change the biophysical and socioeconomic environment in which pastoralists make
migration and transfer choices can induce progressive interhousehold transfers or (unintentionally) further
discourage such acts. For instance, while welfare may be increased due to the provision of public services
and external transfers, the incentives to undertake manipulative private transfers decline. These incentives
could be reversed through other public investments not yet taken. In particular, interventions to reduce
inter-group violence – e.g., through serious conflict resolution intermediation efforts or geographically
expanded police protection – and to increase rangeland carrying capacity through improved water and
range management could stimulate herd mobility, which remains key to pastoralist welfare and wealth
accumulation, and thereby encourage renewal of progressive interhousehold transfers.
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Furthermore, the core principle of our model – that transfers may be state-conditional, rational
responses to identity-dependent strategic complementarities between agents affected by one or more
externalities – and the issue of endogenous provision of security when people identify themselves with
distinct social groups both apply more widely than just to the very specific context of east African
pastoralism.

We briefly propose two concrete, alternative settings where variants of the mechanism

modeled here may well apply and merit further exploration.
First, consider two different cases of joint human migration across long distances. One involves
skilled workers moving from developing countries to foreign lands who often provide a self-serving
transfer (e.g., a plane ticket) to a poorer clanswoman so as to induce her to migrate with them and
subsequently provide domestic (e.g., child care) services. A prime motivation is the desire to preserve the
child’s natal culture and language, i.e., security against cultural erosion, as reflected in the fact that such
behaviors appear more likely the fewer countrymen the skilled migrant expects to find in the destination
and the more alien the host culture. Further, such transfers appear less likely the greater the crowding that
would result from co-residence with the poorer co-migrant. Similarly, migrants from rural villages often
use transfers to induce a neighbor or kinsman to join them in a distant city where a friend and ally can be
valuable in an otherwise-insecure setting where one does not have reliable prior contacts, but can also
create competition for living space, employment, etc. In both cases, trade-offs between security and a
common resource externality help explain the emergence, under specific environmental parameters, of
strategic complementarities that induce transfers that are neither altruistic nor mutual insurance.
The other example we offer, is that of “foot soldiers” in a street gang engaged in illegal activities
such as drug sales or prostitution. Gang members have an incentive to band together so as to protect their
turf against rival gangs. But because they are also competitors for a limited resource (e.g., prospective
customers, social standing), this creates (at least pecuniary) externalities. So long as the former externality
dominates, there is an incentive to give costly gifts – drugs, weapons, money, a uniform, etc. – to induce a
prospective member to join the gang, but not for altruistic or mutual insurance reasons.
These examples illustrate how tradeoffs between a negative common property externality and a
positive security externality may affect behaviors of widespread interest and be more widespread than is
currently appreciated. When weak states are unable or unwilling to provide security services, individuals
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must resolve that state failure through non-market coordination mechanisms that rely heavily on group
identity. The need to endogenously provide security influences economic behavior. Such insights may
help resolve some behavioral puzzles, including but not only the case of interhousehold transfers among
east African pastoralists.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Transfers Conditional on Optimal Ex Post Migration Choices
(cell entries are the value of the transfer)

m1 = 0

m1 = 1
Regressive transfers

2

m =0

0

0 if β21min = 0 or if
[β21min>0,β21max] = Ø
[β21min, β21max] otherwise
Regressive transfers
0 if β21min’ = 0 or if
[β21min’>0,β21max’] = Ø

m2 = 1

.

[β21min’,β21max’] otherwise
Progressive transfers
0 if β12min=0
[β12min,β12max]otherwise

Note: Without loss of generality, let 1 be the wealthier of the two herders in the same ethnic group (L1 ≥ L2).
Also, let Assumption 1 hold.
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Figure 2: Limited Progressive Transfers in Equilibrium
(conditional on m1 = 1, and θ>0)
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Figure 3: No Equilibrium Transfers
(conditional on m1 1, and θ>0)
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NOTES
1

Like Lucas and Stark’s (1985) theory of remittance behavior, we view transfers as a mechanism for

redistributing the gains from some jointly agreeable action. As a result, the transfers can endogenously
vanish when the contract is no longer mutually beneficial.
2

Our ‘service’ does share with some of the previous models the important feature of having no close

market substitutes.
3

See Sobania (1979) and Robinson (1984) for northern Kenya examples.

4

McPeak (2006) reports that 93% of transfers recorded among Gabra pastoralists in northern Kenya from

1993-97 occur between individuals with a mother’s side, father’s side, or in-law relation. Perlov (1987)
describes exchange as a function of the social distance between the two parties. As the rules governing
transfer arrangements follow those of a given ethnic group, almost no exchange across ethnic frontiers
occurs as there are no cultural institutions to allow such exchange. Relatedly, marriage occurs within
ethnic groups. Marriage patterns can potentially foster strategic alliances across clans, but only within
groups that are already natural allies, not enemies.
5

Nor does it seem that transfers have merely changed form, from livestock to money, food or other forms.

Among northern Kenyan and southern Ethiopian pastoralists, interhousehold transfers of any kind are very
modest and not strongly related to the experience of shocks (Lentz and Barrett, 2005).
6

Food aid flows in response to covariate rainfall shocks have also increased over this period. If these were

well-targeted based on household-specific shocks, this could salvage the insurance explanation of declining
transfers, due to the crowding out of private transfers by public ones. But since household-level food aid
receipts in this region are commonly lump sum transfers across households and uncorrelated with
household wealth, income or idiosyncratic income or wealth shocks (Lentz and Barrett, 2005), these do not
seem to affect private transfers in response to idiosyncratic shocks. Thus the puzzle remains.
7

Cattle raiding and its attendant violence are occasionally inter-clan within some ethnic groups. We

simplify in assuming violence is solely between ethnic groups.
8

Agents in our model are purely materially self-interested, so altruism plays no role. And the model is

static, so insurance contracts cannot exist because there is no opportunity for future reciprocation.
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9

Productivity here reflects the production of consumption goods: milk, blood and meat.

10

We assume that no herder can be prohibited from moving by other members of his clan. If multiple

herders each choose to move from one site to another, they necessarily do so together.
11

Note that by construction, L3B equals zero.

12

Both Lybbert et al. (2004) and McPeak (2005) find empirical evidence that mortality and productivity,

respectively, do not necessarily fall with increased livestock in an area, underscoring that appropriation
externalities are not ubiquitous and may frequently be dominated by security externalities.
13

Today, violence and raiding risk almost entirely exist in the satellite areas of the hinterland. The town-

based provision of public security services in the form of police protection provides reasonable assurance
against raiding losses around towns. We simplify this to perfect assurance in the model. Prior to the
introduction of town-based public services a few generations ago, however, there was no practical
distinction between base and satellite areas, so raiding threats were nearly omnipresent.
14

The value of the security risk also increases with the herd size of the rival group, L3. Furthermore, it

reflects the availability and trafficking of weapons in the region, political tensions between groups, and
other factors that are unrelated to stocking rate pressures in the satellite areas of the rangelands. We thus
assume the two externalities are not directly linked, as it appears that little contemporary violence and
livestock raiding in this setting is in fact linked to competition for grazing area (Yirbecho et al., 2004).
15

Since food aid distribution in the region is typically independent of a pastoralists’ wealth, we treat this as

a lump sum that is identical for all pastoralists. Our assumption that food aid is available only in the base
camp is an obvious oversimplification. The key feature is that leaving the satellite area to come to town to
receive food aid entails a nontrivial fixed cost. For simplicity’s sake, we model this cost as prohibitive.
16

There are other prospective benefits to being near town: access to markets and thus a wider variety of

consumer goods, more timely information from the outside world, etc. These other location-specific
amenities merely reinforce the basic logic of our model, namely that the rise of localized provision of
public services changes migration and transfer patterns.
17

For expositional purposes, we present our model for the case of risk-neutral agents only. Risk aversion

merely complicates the analysis without adding substantially different insights.
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18

The area-specific gross total products, PS and PB, and are indeed concave functions of L1 given that θ is a

convex function of L1 and that aggregate herd size, L1+L2, exceeds 2 under any realistic scenario.
19

The simple bivariate correlation coefficient of L1 and m1 equals 0.352 using the 1560 observations of

quarterly household-level data from Lentz and Barrett (2005). See as well Little et al. (2001), McPeak and
Barrett (2001), McPeak (2003), and Kaburo-Mariara (2003). It thus seems in data from the region that herd
size and migration probability are indeed positively correlated. Using a game-theoretic model of migration
and conservation Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder (1999) also lend theoretical support to the idea that richer
herders are more likely to migrate to satellite grazing reserves.
20

A formal proof of this and other omitted (but we believe straightforward) claims to follow, all using the

same Implicit Function Theorem technique that led to Proposition 2, are available on request from the
authors.
21

Higher rainfall in the base area diminishes [fS(RFS) -fB (RFB)] by a factor which is greater than the

induced reduction in the value of Ω. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, increased rainfall in the base area makes
it less likely that the migration condition is fulfilled.
22

While one herder may try to induce another herder to accompany him in his trek to the satellite area, it is

assumed that nobody has the capacity to exclude any group member from moving with him. We thus rule
out the possibility that a poor herder must pay a richer ally for ‘protection’ during his move.
23

This is why herders do not induce poorer herders to trek with them using non-livestock transfers. The

transfer required to induce migration is too expensive, whether paid in animals or other assets (e.g., cash).
24

Note that if the herder refuses to accept the transfer offered by the donor, then his outside option is to

stay in the base area. Hence his threat point is defined by his expected utility from staying when the other,
richer group member nevertheless prefers to move out.
25

Santos and Barrett (2006a) report that 91% of livestock transfers in this region were of just one animal

and less than 2% were of more than two animals.
26

One likely reason for the infrequency of such transfers is the coordination problem that exists when one

generalizes beyond the two person game setting. Since inducing those nearest their migration threshold to
move so as to relieve pressure on the commons is a public good, there exist incentives to free ride.
27

We will shortly consider the possibility of β21= - β12, but abstract from this for the moment.
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28

Note that pastoralist 2’s migration threshold (L*2|m1=1) is, like before, defined by inequality (2), but now

takes into account pastoralist 1’s reduction of his herd size following the minimal transfer.
29

In theory, variable returns to scale could also give rise to the coexistence of progressive and regressive

transfers. Regressive transfers would occur at the low end of the wealth distribution, as poor herders seek to
transfer their herd to bigger herders, and the progressive at the upper tail as wealthy herders reduce their
herds through transfers to smaller neighbors. We know of no empirical evidence to support the variable
returns hypothesis in this setting, however, and each of the several animal scientists we asked discounted
this explanation as highly unlikely. Among other reasons, there would exist serious agency problems (the
transferee could sell or slaughter the extra animals and simply claim they were eaten by wildlife predators),
as similarly reflected in the lack of any significant hiring of herders (unlike in West Africa).
30

Given a finite set of fellow community members, however, 2 may enjoy some bargaining power and be

able to extract a greater transfer, although never beyond the β12max individual rationality constraint imposed
by 1’s choice problem. We leave this bargaining game refinement to future work.
31

Recall from section II that the exogenous factors, including the ex ante herd distribution, determine L*2

by establishing the differential range productivity, fixed and variable movement costs, and the range
appropriation and physical security externality values. So β12min changes with those parameters too.

